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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/CrossPetitioner,

:
:

v.

Case No. 20060189
WADE MAUGHAN,
Defendant/Petitioner.

:
:

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) provides this Court jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals in capital cases.
ISSUES. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Maughan is charged with capital murder. On December 6,2006, one of Mr.
Maughan's two court-appointed attorneys and an investigator were arrested in Spokane,
Washington and alleged to have tampered with witnesses. The police claim that the pair
told witnesses not to speak with police; the witnesses deny ever being told not to speak
with police. No criminal charges have ever been filed. After the arrest, the statefileda
motion to disqualify defense counsel. The parties briefed the issue, and provided
affidavits, reports, transcripts, and DVD's to the trial court. The trial court found that a
potential conflict exists, allowed Mr. Maughan to waive the potential conflict as to one of
the two lawyers, and ordered Mr. Maughan to discharge the other lawyer.
1

This Court reviews a trial court's decision to disqualify counsel applying an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 755 (Utah 2003). "The trial court
must be given substantial deference in making its determination whether to disqualify
counsel because 'the likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are
notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials."5 Id.
(citations omitted). In determining whether to disqualify counsel, however, the trial court
must recognize a presumption in favor of defendant's counsel of choice. Id. The
presumption may be overcome by a demonstration of an actual conflict or by a showing
of a serious potential conflict. Id.
In the motion to disqualify the state argued that defense counsel might be
witnesses as a result of their presence during interviews of potential trial and penalty
phase witnesses. They claimed both an actual conflict and serious potential for conflict
"that mandates disqualification

" Mr. Maughan responded to the motion with a

pleading styled, "Objection to Motion to Disqualify, Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and
Memorandum in Support." Trial Record, 212-485 (hereinafter "TR"). As part of his
response, Mr. Maughan included affidavits from defense team members, their support
staff, transcripts of interviews with witnesses, correspondence, cell phone records, and
other information relating to potential witnesses. Mr. Maughan argued there is no
conflict or potential for conflict and asked the court to deny the state's motion.
The issues presented in this case are as follows:
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L DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THE DEFENSE TEAM TO
HAVE A CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST THEREBY
DISQUALIFYING ONE OF MR. MAUGHAN'S COURT-APPOINTED
LAWYERS?
II. IF THERE IS A CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT, DID MR.
MAUGHAN VALIDLY WAIVE IT?
III. DOES THE COURT'S INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN "POLICING THE
PROCESS" MANDATE THAT THE STATE NOT BE ALLOWED TO
ORCHESTRATE DISQUALIFICATION OF QUALIFIED COUNSEL?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves a protracted tale of events beginning on December 5,2005 and
continuing to this day. Richard Mauro and Ted Cilwick were arrested by the Spokane
City Police on the evening of December 6, 2005 on allegations of witness tampering. TR,
139. The pair interviewed Mr. Maughan's family and friends on the evening of
December 5,2005. That event triggered an unprecedented avalanche of claims,
accusations and proceedings unseen in any previous capital case. There have never been
charges filed. Very simply put, Spokane police claim that three witnesses were told by
members of the defense team not to speak with police. The witnesses deny being told not
to talk to police. Instead, every witness did speak with police several times subsequent to
the defense interviews and repeatedly deny the police claim that they were told not to talk
to police.
Mr. Maughan contends that the defense team acted in accordance with duties and
responsibilities set forth by the American Bar Association Guidelines for the
3

Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
Since December, 2005, the case has had little to do with Wade Maughan, and has
instead focused on alleged misdeeds by the defense team. In addition to the Spokane
claims the government has accused defense team members of communication fraud,
obstruction of justice, and notary fraud. Additionally, they claimed one member of the
defense team pretended to be a Channel 2 television news reporter. The trial judge even
issued an ex parte search warrant for that lawyer's personal and business cell phone
records. They claimed that another lawyer may have committed witness tampering in
Spokane when that lawyer had nothing to do with this case. They alleged wrongdoing
against members of the defense team, when after being threatened with arrest, Spokane
witnesses retained lawyers.
As outlined below, the claims and allegations have been proven to be false. It is
believed that many of the claims were made in an attempt to bolster the weak allegations
of witness tampering. The state is seeking to manufacture a conflict where none exists.
The defense team has at all times acted ethically in conformance with their required
duties of qualified capital counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 4, 2005, the Box Elder County Attorney's Office filed a two-count
information against Wade Garrett Maughan charging him with capital murder, a crime
punishable by death, and aggravated robbery, afirstdegree felony which carries a
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maximum penalty of five years to life. (TR, 1). During the week of November 14,2005,
Richard Mauro, a Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 qualified lawyer,1 received a phone
callfromthe Utah Court Administrator's Office regarding appointment of counsel in the
Wade Maughan case. (TR, 257). On or about November 17, 2005, Mr. Mauro sent an
appearance of counsel to the First District Court which was received on November 18,
2005. (TR, 21,258). Scott Williams, another Rule 8 qualified lawyer, agreed to serve as
Mr. Maughan's co-counsel. (TR, 258,264). Mr. Williams entered an appearance of
counsel on December 2,2005, which was received by the court on December 5,2005.
(TR, 34).
Both Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams have extensive experience in the defense of
capital cases developed at the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association and through
acceptance of court-appointed capital cases after the two left the Legal Defender Office.
(TR, 255-57,264). The pair also has extensive experience in the defense of persons
charged with non-capital homicides. (TR, 257,264).
On December 5,2005, the court formally appointed Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams
as Rule 8 counsel for Mr. Maughan. (TR, 31; December 5, 2005 Transcript of Pretrial
Conference Hearing, 4 (hereinafter "12/5/05 Transcript")). As of the date of appointment

1

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 sets forth the criteria and qualifications for
appointment of counsel in death penalty cases. Attorneys appointed to represent deatheligible defendants must meet certain minimal experience requirements including
proficiency in felony and homicide trials, specific training in the trial of capital cases, and
must have practiced law for at leastfiveyears.
5

on December 5,2005, the defense had very little discovery. The discovery which was
sent to the defense included two DVD tapes of police interviews with Mr. Maughan and
Mr. Griffin. (12/5/05 Transcript, 3; TR, 260). Upon receipt of the DVD's on December
2, 2005, Mr. Maughan discovered that the Glenn Griffin interview and one of two Wade
Maughan DVD's were defective. (TR, 260). The state provided replacement copies of
the defective DVD's on December 5,2005.
Near the end of November 2005, the defense team retained Ted Cilwick, an
experienced capital investigator to assist in the investigation of Mr. Maughan's case.
(TR, 270). Prior to Mr. Maughan's case, Mr. Cilwick had served as an investigator on
eighteen capital cases, sixteen at the trial level, and two post-conviction cases. (TR, 270)
Prior to December 5, 2005, Mr. Cilwick had reviewed none of the discovery in Mr.
Maughan's case. (TR,271).
On December 5,2005, Mr. Mauro, Mr. Williams, and Mr. Cilwick attended Mr.
Maughan's court hearing in Brigham City that began a little after 9:00 a.m. (TR, 271)
Prior to the hearing, Mr. Mauro, Mr. Williams, and Mr. Cilwick met with Mr. Maughan
in the Box Elder County Courthouse holding cell. (TR, 258-59, 270, 219). "During the
discussion [with Mr. Maughan], a Box Elder County Sheriffs Deputy Bailiff was inside
the holding area. That same day Spokane City [Washington] Police Detective Mark
Burbridge received a call from Box Elder County Deputy Sheriff Scott Lewis requesting
Burbridge interview Mr. Maughan's Spokane-based family and friends. Wade Maughan
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was arrested on November 2,2005; the first request for police interviews of his family
and friends was made 33 days later on December 5,2005, the same day the defense team
scheduled interviews with Mr. Maughan's family and friends." (TR, 219) (citations
omitted).
Later that day, Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick flew to Spokane to meet with Wade
Maughan's family and friends. Earlier that day, Spokane City Detective Mark Burbridge
contacted Mr. Maughan's girlfriend, Lorraine Rima. (TR, 118). Burbridge asked Ms.
Rima about Mr. Maughan's drinking habits, length of time she knew Wade, and his state
of sobriety on the day of the police interview, thirty-three days earlier. (TR, 118-119).
Burbridge also obtained the address of one of Wade's Spokane-based friends, Randy
Wager. (TR, 119). Burbridge left his business card at Mr. Wager's home. On the
morning of December 6, 2005, Burbridge listened to a voice mail message in which Mr.
Wager "said he would speak with [Burbridge]." (TR, 119).
Mr. Wager told police he had met with Wade Maughan's lawyer and an
investigator at the home of Lorraine Rima on the evening of December 5, 2005. (TR,
332-33, 6202) This meeting was prearranged. (TR, 332). Mr. Wager knew he was
meeting with Wade's lawyer and a "private detective" or investigator from Utah, because
they stated their identity and left a card at Ms Rima's home. Mr. Wager indicated that the

2

TR 620 is a DVD interview of Randy Wager conducted by Deputy Box Elder
County Attorney Brad Smith.
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meeting lasted "for a good hour . . . , " and involved discussions about Mr. Wager's
relationship with Mr. Maughan, "how long [Mr. Wager] had known Wade and all that."
(TR, 334).
The next day, Mr. Wager called the police number on the card left at his house and
agreed to meet with Detective Mark Burbridge of the Spokane City Police Department.
Detective Burbridge and another Spokane Police Officer went to Mr. Wager's house on
December 6, 2005 to interview him. It is somewhat difficult to follow Mr. Wager's
recollection of events because he is disabled and suffers from grand mal seizures,3 but
according to Mr. Wager, police visited him twice. The first time Mr. Wager spoke to
police and answered questions about Mr. Maughan. During this first meeting, however,
the police accused Mr. Wager of lying and tried to "trick" him into providing information
against Wade Maughan. (TR, 620 at approximately 22:30 to 25:35). Although the
interview is unclear, it seems that Mr. Wager told police at the second meeting that he did
not want to talk to police because he was told not to talk to anybody by a Utah lawyer and
investigator. (TR, 620 at approximately 25:35)
At an earlier interview, Mr. Wager remembers that the lawyer and investigator said
"do not discuss the case with Wade in the jail." (TR, 6-7). He was never told by anyone

3

In the February 2005 interview with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wager described the
disability for which he receives SSI disability payments as "slow learning" and back
problems. TR, 620. He also acknowledged that he has "short term memory problems."
Id.
8

not to talk to or cooperate with the police. (TR, 334). At that same earlier interview, Mr.
Wager stated he did not want to speak with the detective because the police were "against
Wade." This was presumably the same interview where the police accused Mr. Wager of
lying. (See TR, 620). At the earlier interview, Mr. Wager describes his encounter with
police as follows:
Q [Ken Brown]:

So [Det. Burbridge] came over to your house early in the
morning the next day, right?

A [Randy Wager]: Yeah
Q:

And you spoke with him about this case, you spoke with Detective
Burbridge, is that right?

A:

Yeah. And he told me I was lying.

Q:

Okay. The officer reports that when he went to your house that you refused
to speak with him, is that correct?

A:

Right.

Q:

Did you refuse to speak with him because you didn't want to speak with
him or because the lawyer had told you not to speak with him?

A:

I didn't want to speak with him because he was against Wade. I didn't want
to-

Q:

So that was your decision?

A:

That was my decision.

Q:

What was his reaction to that?

A:

He told me if I didn't talk to him that I'd be committing obstructing,
obstruction of justice and that I could be arrested for it.
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Q:

Did he threaten to arrest you if you didn't speak with him?

A:

Not so much as saying he was going to arrest me but he said that I could be
arrested for not talking to him.

Q:

Did he call you a liar?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Did he say that you didn't have a choice as to whether or not you spoke
with him?

A:

Pretty much.

Q:

Okay. What was his reaction when you told him that, that you didn't want
to speak with him?

A:

Kind of got aggravated.

Q:

Did he raise his voice?

A:

Not really raised his voice but he, his tone kind of changed, you know, like
he was upset with me.

Q:

Okay, and, alright. But - and so after - when he came in and then you have
a discussion with him about this case, right?

A:

Right.

Q:

Okay. Now, so that we are clear, the lawyers - the lawyer and the
investigator didn't ever tell you not to speak with police?

A:

No.

Q:

You just simply didn't want to speak with police, right?

A:

Right.

Q:

And that's because you were a friend of Wade's?
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A:

Right.

Q:

Has nothing to do with the lawyer and the investigator?

A:

No.

Q:

Now, did you, you were present for the meeting with Mr. Mauro and Mr.
Cilwick in the house?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

And they never told you, anybody in the house not to talk to the police, is
that correct?

A:

No, they just said, do not discuss this case with anybody and do not discuss
it with Wade.

Q:

Specifically don't discuss it with Wade and generally not talk to anybody?4

A:

Right.

Q:

Okay. And then when the officer showed up the next day, you made the
decision that you didn't want to talk to the officer, had nothing to do with
any advice that you had been given by the lawyer and the investigator, is
that correct?

A:

Well, when they said anybody, I took that to mean the police, too.

Q:

But they never said, "Don't talk to the police?"

A:

No, they never said, "Don't talk to the police," never did they ever say that.

TR, 336-38.
Alta Raney, Randy Wager's mother was present for the discussion with the Utah

4

In a subsequent interview with Deputy County Attorney Brad Smith, Mr. Wager
remembers being told, "don't discuss the case with anybody." TR, 620 at approximately
15:28 into the interview.
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attorney and investigator at Lorraine Rima's house on December 5, 2005. (TR, 358-61).
Ms. Raney remembers that the Utah lawyer and investigator told them not "to talk to
Wade over the phone about the case." (TR, 361). She remembers that '[i]t was
something about the confusion of the case, that they weren't suppose to talk to Wade
about the case, because they didn't want Wade and Lorraine and Randy putting their
stories together." TR, 361. "[A]t no time did Mr. Mauro or Mr. Cilwick urge Ms. Rima
or Mr. Wager that they should not speak with police." (TR, 643). "In fact, Mr. Cilwick
and Mr. Mauro cautioned the witnesses not to contact [Mr. Maughan] or share accounts
with other witnesses in the interest of not compromising the integrity of the accounts they
were providing. This instruction was given to preserve evidence." (TR, 643-44). Ms.
Raney interpreted the admonition to not discuss the case with Wade Maughan as
including an admonition not to talk to police because of a reluctance to cooperate with
police. Ms. Raney expressed reluctance to speak with police because of law
enforcement's prior mistreatment of her son. (TR, 644).
After visiting Randy Wager on December 6, 2005, Spokane Police Officer
Burbridge went back to the home of Lorraine Rima to speak with her. Ms. Rima is also
completely disabled, takes fourteen different medications, and suffers memory loss as a
side effect of one of the medications. (TR, 394-95). She spoke to police about her visit
with a lawyer and an investigator from Utah on December 14, 2005. (TR, 382).
Detective Burbridge initiated the following colloquy:
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DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Did you say something similar to me like, "Mark, I
can't talk to you anymore: they5 told me I would be in trouble if I talked to you?
MS. RIMA: No, I didn't say I would get in trouble.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: "No I can't talk to you"?
MS. RIMA: No. I just said that I can't - they said I couldn't talk to nobody.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You said I couldn't talk to the police?
MS. RIMA: Yeah.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Is that what you said?
MS. RIMA: No, not the police. That I can't interview with them guys. I mean,
they said that I will go to jail if I (inaudible). He left on - 1 don't even know what
day he left.6
TR, 384.
Later in the interview, Burbridge asks if she was told not to talk to the police:
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I recall you saying and my sergeant recalls you
saying, "I can't talk to the police. They told me I couldn't.
MS. RIMA: They - no. My attorney told - not my attorney, but the dude said I he don't want me to talk to them. It would look better on my case, on me, so I
can't.
5

Throughout the interview, Burbridge uses pronouns to refer to persons without
using names. As is clear in the interview Ms. Rima is often confused when questions are
asked using "they," "them," and other similar pronouns.
6

Ms. Rima seems to be talking about two things in this answer: 1. Something
about an interview with "they"; and 2. A person referred to as "he" leaving from
someplace. The "he" she is referring to when considered in light of the remainder of the
interview is probably Wade Maughan who left Spokane thirty-three days earlier. The
police, however, believe the "he" referred to is Mr. Maughan's lawyer and investigator as
is evident from the subsequent questions.
13

TR, 385-86.
Ms. Rima believed that because she was at the police station being interviewed,
she was in some kind of trouble, apparently independent of what anyone told her about
Wade Maughan's case. (TR, 386). Detective Burbridge acknowledged that Ms. Rima
"get[s] confused easily . . . , " to which Ms. Rima responded, "Yeah, I do a lot. I didn't
take my medicine today and I'm kind of in a fog here." (TR, 386). Later in the interview,
the detective asks Ms. Rima to identify the various people that visited her house. The
detective explains that one of Wade's attorneys and an investigator visited her, to which
Ms. Rima responds that another police detective and sergeant also visited her. (TR, 390).
The Detective asks a third and fourth time if Ms. Rima was told not to talk to
police:
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Do you think you misunderstood them at all
when they talked to you that day?
MS. RIMA: I knew about it. I just didn't want to tell them. I was embarrassed to
talk because I didn't feel very good.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Did you misunderstand them when they were talking
about "Don't talk to the anybody" or "Don't talk to the police"?
MS. RIMA: I didn't even hear them say that.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: What's your mem - what's your memory MS. RIMA: I need to stop. I need to take my medication.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I'm sorry. What is your memory of the exact
wording they used with you that day, "Don't talk to anybody" or "Don't talk to the
police"?
14

MS. RIMA: They said I can't, not to talk to the policeman.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay.
MS. RIMA: And not to let them guys taking any more of my stuff at home.
Because they didn't have a search warrant, they just took it.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: No. I'm talking about the guys that took your stuff.
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. That's what I'm talking about.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. What did they say to you that day? What's
your exact wording?
MR. STAAB [MS. RIMA'S ATTORNEY]: If you remember.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: If you remember about what they said?
MS. RIMA: I don't remember.
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay.
MS. RIMA: I don't know. I'm upset with all this stuff.
(TR, 391-92).
On February 10,2006, Box Elder Deputy County Attorney Brad Smith again asked
Ms. Rima a series of questions about whether she was told not to talk to police:
MR. SMITH: Did they [the peoplefromUtah] say anything else?
MS. RIMA: Urn, no.
MR. SMITH: Did they discuss with you whether you should talk to anybody else
about what they spoke to you about?
MS. RIMA: Nope.
MR. SMITH: You don't recall anything like that?
15

MS. RIMA: Uh-huh (no)(shakes head no on video).
MR. SMITH: Do you recall them asking you not to talk to anybody?
MS. RIMA: Yeah that was up here they told us.
MR. SMITH: When you say that was up here, Where do you mean up here?
MS. RIMA: It's at the - 1 think - where did I have the, my (inaudible) - 1 just got
over the flu.
MR. SMITH: Okay.
MS. RIMA: Let me see, I'm not too sure.
MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall Mr. Mauro telling you anything like that?
MS. RIMA: No, he never said nothing.
MR. SMITH: Did mister - the other person who was with him say anything like
that?
MS. RIMA: They said, yeah they did MR. SMITH: - what'd they say?
MS. RIMA: The answer's no - when they said. You're mixing me up.
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry.
TR, 611 (DVD interview of Lorraine Rima at approximately 10:40 to 11:35).
On December 6,2005, Richard Mauro and Ted Cilwick were arrested in Spokane,
Washington by Officers Mark Burbridge and Joe Peterson. (TR, 37). Peterson originally
alleged that one of the people arrested represented themselves to be a police officer. (TR,
37). Burbridge claims that when he went to the home of Randy Wager on the morning of
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December 6,2005, Wager told him that "Wade Maughan's attorney and investigator...
told him not to speak with police." (TR, 119). In an affidavit presented to the Box Elder
County Prosecutor's Office, Mark Burbridge described the Lorraine Rima December 14,
2005 interview discussed above:
Detective Mark Burbridge will testify that on 12/14/05, Lorraine Rima came to the
police station and consented to a videotaped interview. Ms. Rima related that she
remembers telling Detective Burbridge that the attorneys had ordered her not to
speak with the police, but when asked if they had indicated she would be in trouble
if she did, she said she didn't remember that occurring. Detective Burbridge will
testify that later on during this interview, Ms. Rima indicated that at some point the
attorney and detective from Utah told her she could go to jail if she talked about
this incident. Detective Burbridge will testify that during the videotaped
interview, Ms. Rima seemed easily confused, but was adamant that the attorneys
had told her not to talk to police.
(TR, 125).
After the arrests of Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick, the police went back to the home
of Randy Wager and Alta Raney. The police learned that "a second group of attorney's
(sic) contacted her and her son." (TR, 129) According to Spokane Police, "[t]hose
attorneys explained there was a misunderstanding and it was o.k. for them to talk to
police." Id. Alta Raney remembers the meeting with the second group of Wade
Maughan defense team members differently:
MS. RANEY: Yeah. He came up [to the second meeting] with, what was his
name, Scott, what's the other guy's name that comes to the house?
KEN BROWN: Charlie?
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MS. RANEY: Charlie, Charlie, he came up with Charlie.7
KEN BROWN: So they came over and you explained to them that it was your
confusion, is that right?
MS. RANEY: Yeah.
KEN BROWN: What did you explain to them?
MS. RANEY: Well, I told, Randy and I both told him that hey, they said not to talk
to anybody, Burbridge is anybody, so we weren't going to talk to him until we
found out that it was okay to talk to him.
KEN BROWN: Okay. And these other, these other - this Scott Williams did not
suggest that you were confused, it was you that told Scott you were confused?
MS. RANEY: Yeah, yeah, because - you know, he didn't say, those guys didn't
say, "Don't talk to the cops," you know, they just said, "Don't talk to Wade about
it and don't talk to anybody else."
Well, as far as I'm concerned when they say anybody else that includes the
cops.
(TR, 366-67).
When Alta Raney tried to explain the reason for her confusion to police they
repeatedly accused her of lying. (TR, 368-69). Ms. Raney became so exasperated with
police she finally kicked them out of her house stating: "There is the door. Get the hell
out of my house." (TR, 368). The Spokane Police continued to harass Ms. Raney even
after she retained an attorney. Gina Costello, Ms. Raney's attorney, indicated that she

7

The Charlie referred to in the interview is Charles Schlessinger, a Spokane-based
private investigator retained by the defense team. The state initially believed that the
person accompanying Mr. Williams to the second set of interviews was David Finlayson,
an attorney who shares office space with Scott Williams and Richard Mauro.
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would seek a protective order against Spokane City Officer Mark Burbridge should
harassment of her client continue. (TR, 644).
On December 27,2005, case agent, Detective Scott Cosgrove,8 called both Richard
Mauro and Scott Williams, Wade Maughan's attorneys, requesting the they make
themselves available for a police interview. (TR, 698). Mr. Williams returned the call
inquiring the purpose of police interviews with lawyers appointed to represent a
defendant in a death penally case. The detective never informed Mr. Williams about the
subject of the interview other than to state that it was for possible criminal activity. Id.
Mr. Williams considered the request to be "remarkable, offensive, and unprofessional."
Id.
On that same day, Mark Moffat one of the lawyers retained by Mr. Mauro and Mr.
Cilwick after their arrests wrote to the Box Elder County Attorney explaining that an
independent investigation showed no evidence of witness tampering or wrongdoing by
either Mr. Cilwick or Mr. Mauro. (TR, 134). Mr. Moffat specifically informed the
prosecutors that claims of witness tampering "have substantially interfered with Mr.
Mauro's and Mr. Williams' efforts to represent Mr. Maughan." Id.
Nonetheless, on January 4, 2006, the Box Elder County Attorney's Office filed a
Motion to Disqualify Counsel. In addition to allegations of witness tampering, they made

8

In November 2006, Scot Cosgrove was fired by the Box Elder County Sheriff for
alleged acts of misconduct. He is no longer the case agent on the Maughan case.
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a number of claims against the defense team that have been proven to be absolutely false.
They alleged that on the morning of December 5,2005, that Mr. Mauro visited the home
of Cheryl Elzinga in Brigham City, Utah:
At approximately 10:20 a.m. on December 5, 2005 an individual subsequently
identified as Rich Mauro went to the residence of Cheryl A. Elzinga in Brigham
City asking questions about Glenn Griffin. Mr. Mauro is alleged to have falsely
identified himself as a Channel 2 reporter. Ms. Elzinga noted that Mr. Mauro was
a passenger in a white SUV. On December 21,2005, the Box Elder News Journal
ran a story of Mauro and Cilwick's arrests. The story contained booking photos of
Mauro and Cilwick. When Ms. Elzinga saw the story, she recognized the photo of
Mauro as being the same individual who had come to her house representing that
he was a Channel 2 reporter. Ms. Elzinga reported this incident to Box Elder
detectives on December 22,2005.
(TR,51).
The Box Elder County Attorneys went so far as alleging that Scott Williams might
have been the getaway car driver of the white SUV and might thereby be a witness to
second degree felony communications fraud by Mr. Mauro.9 (TR, 68). Although the Box
Elder Countyfilingdecisions would be referred to another county, the assigned Box Elder
County Attorney to the Maughan case nevertheless "reviewed" an ex parte search warrant
authorizing the search of Mr. Mauro's private cell phone records. On January 19,2006,
Jeff Johnson of the Brigham City Police Department, after first consulting with Deputy
Box Elder County Attorney H. Thomas Stevenson, the prosecutor in Wade Maughan's

9

The Box Elder County Attorney alleged that the Elzinga allegations constituted
second degree felony communications fraud because by asking Ms. Elzinga if she was
good friends with Glenn Griffin, the defense was attempting to obtain something of value
by false pretenses. (TR, 61, 68)
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case, sought and obtained from Judge Ben H. Hadfield, the judge in Mr. Maughan's case,
an ex parte search warrant authorizing the prosecuting attorney to obtain Mr. Mauro9s
private and business cell phone records. (TR, 297-300,410). Police executed the warrant
the same day.
Ms. Elzinga claimed that the "reporter" knocked on her door and asked one
question about Glenn Griffin. She slammed the door in the "reporter's" face. She then
claimed that the "reporter" went to the passenger side of the white SUV, pulled out a cell
phone, and called her home telephone. The caller identification allegedly showed
"private caller." (TR, 114). Upon receipt of Mr. Mauro9 s private cell phone records, the
prosecutor learned that Mr. Mauro made or received two phone calls on the morning of
December 5,2005, one to his office and one received from his office. (TR, 259-60,28990,303). Based on the cell phone tower logs obtained by the prosecution, Mr. Mauro was
in Brigham City, Utah at 9:18 when he called his office, (TR, 305-15, 318)10 and was
approximately two blocks from his office at 43 East 400 South in Salt Lake City at 10:29
a.m., when Ms. Elzinga claimed he was in Brigham City, Utah. (TR, 305-15, 318).
The defense obtained Ms. Elzinga's home phone records which showed no

10

December 5,2005 was the date of the initial court hearing. According to the
court docket, the hearing began at 9:11 a.m. The parties briefly discussed scheduling
matters and the cell phone records indicate that Mr. Mauro called his office at 9:18 a.m.
while still in Brigham City. Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams drove to and from Brighan City
together that morning in Mr. Williams' maroon Audi. (TR, 258,265). They arrived back
in Salt Lake City just before 10:30 a.m. (TR, 260). Soon after arriving in Salt Lake City,
Mr. Mauro left for the airport and flew to Spokane, Washington.
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incoming telephone calls between 9:20 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. (TR, 321-28). The police
had apparently not disclosed to the trial judge that Ms. Elzinga was working with police
in an attempt to obtain incriminating information against Glenn Griffin, the co-defendant.
(TR, 232, Elzinga video interview, TR, 278, exhibit 4). Ms. Elzinga described to
Brigham City Police Officer Jeff Johnson how she and her husband had been visiting
Glenn Griffin at the jail, pretending to be his friend, all the while working in connection
with law enforcement to obtain evidence against Mr. Griffin. (Elzinga Video Interview,
TR, 232). The police were aware that Ms. Elzinga was trying to obtain evidence against
Mr. Griffin and seemed to encourage it:
as far as your involvement with the sheriffs office, we'll let that play out first.
And we won't, we're not going to make any waves, I guess is what I'm saying.
We'll be very quiet, and we'll make sure nothing happens that jeopardizes what
you're doing right now in your relationship with Glenn or the Perrys, okay.
Elzinga Videotaped Interview, Statement of Brigham City Police Officer Jeff Johnson.
In addition to the phone records, the Elzinga claims began to unravel on two
additional grounds. It seems that Ms. Elzinga wrote a number of salacious and graphic
love letters to Glenn Griffin describing sexual fantasies and professing her love for Mr.
Griffin. (TR, 411-13, 419-482). The police expressed concern over the nature of the
graphic love letters, which police had intercepted. (TR, 411). Additionally, the police
were apparently recording the phone calls between Ms. Elzinga and Mr. Griffin where
they learned that Ms. Elzinga misrepresented things told to her by Brigham City Police
Officer Jeff Johnson. TR, 234,411. Johnson believes that Ms. Elzinga is lying about
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information discussed with him:
During the [phone] call [to Glenn Griffin] Cheryl mocks her interview with me,
twisting and distorting the entire interview, including fabricating parts of the
interview that never happened. The entire behavior is alarming, and presents
serious issues regarding the direction and future of this case.
TR,412,
Officer Johnson continued:
[0]n the phone calls and letters Cheryl becomes Glenn's lover and future partner.
At minimum, the "facade" is quite convincing. At another point the facade
becomes alarming. Due to the persuasiveness and believability of Cheryl during
the calls, who Cheryl really is, and what she is really doing, looms as a major
question. Cheryl is either lying to investigators in this case, or is lying quite
convincingly to Glenn Griffin. In either event, Cheryl's credibility is at stake.
(TO, 412).
Despite the concerns with Ms. Elzinga's credibility, Officer Johnson nonetheless
still recommended that a criminal case against Mr. Mauro be referred to the county
attorney for screening: "The case will be referred to the County Attorney's Office for
review, consultation, and the possible filing of criminal charges against Mauro." TR,
413. When confronted with this information, the state acknowledged that "Ms. Elzinga's
reliability as a witness" is suspect. (TR, 547). "The questions regarding her reliability ..
. are so significant that the State can not, at this time, rely on her as (sic) witness in its
Motion to Disqualify." Id. (emphasis in original). Although "the State recommended the
court wholly disregard Ms. Elzinga's allegations regarding Mr. Mauro . . . , " they
nonetheless still ask the court to defer such ruling until review of the videotape interview
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between the Elzingas and Officer Johnson. Id. The court did not address the Elzinga
allegations in its memorandum decision.
The state claimed that Scott Williams also committed witness tampering alleging
that Scott Williams might have been among "a second group of attorneys [who] met with
the witnesses and convinced them that there may have been a misunderstanding about
their dealings with Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick." (TR, 66). The state then leaps to the
unsupported belief that David Finlayson was one of the persons involved in witness
tampering. (TR, 66). On February 6, 2006, David Finlayson filed an affidavit with the
trial court, indicating that he has "done no work in the case of State of Utah v. Wade
Maughan, and was not in Spokane, Washington the week of December 5,2005. Any
suggestions or assertions to the contrary are false." Despite that affidavit, on February 10,
2005, Deputy County Attorney Brad Smith still questioned witnesses Randy Wager and
Lorraine Rima about whether David Finlayson participated in questioning the witnesses.
(TR, 612, Videotaped Interview of Lorraine Rima; TR, 620 Videotaped Interview of
Randy Wager).
After police in Spokane accused Randy Wager and Alta Raney of possible
obstruction ofjustice, TR, 336-38, the pair along with Lorraine Rima retained attorneys.
Box Elder County prosecutors suggested wrongdoing in their choice to retain attorneys.
(TR, 542). The Utah prosecutors requested information about how the witnesses obtained
attorneys, suggesting that the Spokane County Attorney's Office may be "interested]" in
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that information. (TR, 545). Ken Brown, retained attorney representing the defense
team, explained that members of the Spokane legal community volunteered their services
on behalf of the witnesses:
Regarding the Spokane witnesses, those witnesses advised Scott Williams and an
investigator that they had been threatened with arrest, bullied, called liars and
otherwise mistreated by the Spokane Police and that they had no interest in dealing
with Spokane Police without counsel. Members of the Spokane Legal Community
volunteered their services in representing these individuals. We have neither
directed nor controlled these lawyers and find the inference that we are doing so
offensive. I am sure you would agree with me that these people are entitled and
probably should have counsel and I told you that yesterday.
(TR, 586).
Despite that explanation, the Box Elder County Attorney still suggested that
"counsel for attorneys counsel [Ken Brown and Mark Moffat]" might somehow have
committed a violation of law or obstruction, might be controlling the actions of the
lawyers, and might be paying the lawyers. (TR, 542-43).
On March 22, 2006, the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office attempted to contact a
fourth member of the defense team, this time mitigation specialist, Marissa Sandall. (TR,
701 743-44). Detective Lewis stated that he "needed to interview [Ms. Sandall], and
asked if [she] would meet with him at the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office." (TR, 701).
When asked for the purpose of the interview, Detective Lewis responded, "This is
regarding the Wade Maughan case. We've got some questions we need to ask you

"

(TR, 743, 701). The phone call caused Ms. Sandall "considerable concern and anxiety . . .
given the things that have been alleged against, and done to other members of the Wade
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Maughan defense team." (TR, 702). As a result of that phone call, Mr. Maughanfileda
Motion for Emergency Order to Prohibit Police Contacting and Harassing Defense
Counsel, Defense Witnesses, and Persons Working on the Defense Team and Request for
Emergency Hearing. (TR, 692).
The Box Elder County Attorney's Office claimed that Ms. Sandall committed
notary fraud by delivering release of information forms to Wade Maughan at the Cache
County Jail and allegedly having those forms later notarized by a person at her office.
(TR, 778-79). The allegation came to light when Box Elder County Sheriffs Office
received a release of information form from Ms. Sandall for jail records to be used in
preparation of Mr. Maughan9 s mitigation case. After receipt of the release form, a
county employee named Barbara Hereford called Ms. Sandall and recorded the
conversation. (TR, 741-42). In the phone call, Ms. Sandall indicates that Mr. Maughan's
signature was notarized at her office and not at the jail.11 Detective Scott Lewis, one of
the investigating officers in Wade Maughan's case, also called Ms. Sandall seeking to
question her in her person in what he described as a "phone sensitive" matter. (TR,743).
In the four month period beginning in December 2005, the state has alleged
criminal activity against Mr. Maughan's entire defense team including felonies for
witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and communications fraud, and misdemeanor

11

There is no dispute that the signature on the form sent to the Box Elder County
Attorney's Office is Wade Maughan's.
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offenses including notary fraud. They have suggested that lawyer David Finlayson
committed witness tampering, and Mr. Maughan's retained lawyers somehow did
something unethical or illegal because witnesses in Spokane retained pro bono attorneys.
After reviewing the pleadings, the court issued a memorandum decision. The
court ordered Mr. Maughan "to confer with counsel during the noon hour and then select
one of the current counsel to remain as co-counsel." The court found that "there is at
least a reasonable possibility that either a serious violation of law or ethical standards
occurred." The court emphasized, however, that defense counsel committed no
wrongdoing:
This Court is not making a finding that defense counsel have committed
wrongdoing. On the contrary, this Court's prior dealings with both defense
counsel have all been positive. This Court finds today only that there is a
reasonable possibility that witness tampering occurred,
TR,
Although Mr. Maughan objected to the court's ruling requiring him to choose one
of his two lawyers, he nonetheless chose Mr. Mauro to remain as his lawyer.

L THE DEFENSE TEAM DOES NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OR
POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THEIR
REPRESENTATION OF WADE MAUGHAN
A. Mr. Maughan's Defense Team Conducted the Investigation in Conformance
with American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
The responsibilities of representing persons charged with capital crimes "are
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uniquely demanding, both in the highly specialized legal knowledge that counsel must
possess and in the advocacy skills he or she must master." American Bar Association
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, Guideline 1.1, at 4 (2003)(hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"); see United States v.
Wilson, 354 F. Supp.2d 246 (E.D.N. Y. 2005)("Because of the stakes involved and the
unique procedural aspects of a capital proceeding, representing a capital defendant
requires a great deal of technical expertise specific to capital cases that can only be gained
through firsthand experience."). One of the main duties of a lawyer undertaking capital
representation is "to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the
issues of both guilt and penalty." Id. Guideline 10.7, at 76. When conducting
investigation an attorney should always "conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the
presence of a third person so there is someone to call as defense witness at trial." Id. at
79; Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Prosecution Function and Defense
Function, § 4.3(d)(Approved Draft 1971). "Alternatively, counsel should have an
investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews." Id}2
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The ABA Standards outlined above discuss the importance of the presence of a
third party in the event that the lawyer needs to call an impeachment witness. ("Unless
the lawyer for the accused is prepared to forego impeachment of a witness by the lawyer's
own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw
from the case in order to present his impeaching testimony, the lawyer should avoid
interviewing a prospective witness except in the presence of a third person.").
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One of the principal groups of witnesses who should be interviewed includes socalled mitigation witnesses:
witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that might affect the
likelihood that the client committed the charged offense(s), the degree of
culpability for the offense, including:
(a) members of the client's immediate and extended family
(b) neighbors, friends and acquaintances who knew the client or his family
(c) former teachers, clergy, employers, co-workers, social service providers,
and doctors
(d) correctional, probation or parole officers.
ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.7, Commentary, at 79.
Investigative work in capital cases must be done regardless of the client's desires
and despite the belief "that investigation would be futile." Id. "Speed is often essential in
the investigation of a particular case." F. Lee Bailey and Kenneth J. Fishman, Criminal
Trial Techniques, § 5:3 (2004). Useful evidence may be lost, and witnesses may
disappear or forget relevant facts. Id. This is particularly true of witnesses in "marginal
economic classes" who are often more difficult to locate and whose memories are
frequently suspect. Id, § 5:4 ("Investigate quickly those witnesses likely to be mobile and
those who are likely to forget if they are not interviewed soon.").
In this case, the defense team complied with their duties to investigate and
interview potentially important witnesses. They traveled to Spokane, Washington on the
day of formal appointment and arranged to interview potential penalty phase witnesses.
Given their economic and social backgrounds these witnesses were "likely to be mobile..
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., and likely to forget..." if not interviewed quickly. Moreover, it was evident prior to
the interviews that the potential witnesses might subsequently be difficult to locate.13
This is true of the three witnesses who the state claims were tampered with.
B. There is No Actual Conflict of Interest
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the
Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to effective assistance of counsel, which
entails conflict-free representation and a duty of loyalty. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah 1999). In the Sixth
Amendment context, an "actual conflict" is a division of loyalties that "adversely affects
counsel's performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002). To establish such
a conflict, it must be shown that defense counsel will be required to make choices that
would advance his own interests to the detriment of the defendant. See Lovell, 984 P.2d
at 387 (citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)). "In determining whether
to disqualify counsel [for a conflict of interest], the trial court must recognize a

13

Lorraine Rima, Wade Maughan's girlfriend or common law wife was
completely disabled, took fourteen medications daily, and suffered from the often
debilitating effects of lupus. She relied upon Mr. Maughan as her primary support system
both to assist with regulating her medications, overseeing daily heath care, and financial
stability. After Mr. Maughan's arrest, Ms. Rima lost her primary caretaker, a significant
amount of monthly income, and was on the verge of losing her apartment. See Bailey and
Fishman, supra, §§ 5:3 & 5:4 ("Investigate quickly those witnesses likely to be mobile . . .
."); ABA Guideline 10.7, Commentary, at 82 ("The mitigation investigation should begin
as quickly as possible
"). Likewise, Randy Wager is completely disabled, suffers
from short-term memory loss, and is economially disadvantaged. It was therefore
important to interview these witnesses quickly.
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presumption in favor of defendant's counsel of choice." State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731,
755 (Utah 2003)(citation omitted). The interest in keeping counsel of one's choice is
"strong and deserves great respect." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,490 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); Arguelles, 63 P.2d at 755; State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962-64 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
The presumption in favor of counsel of choice "may be overcome by a
demonstration of an actual conflict or by a showing of a serious potential conflict."
Arguelles, 63 P.2d at 755 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988)).
However, courts may only sever an attorney-client relationship under extreme
circumstances, and disqualification must only occur in rare circumstances. See Wheat,
486 U.S. at 164; Arguelles, 63 P.3d at 735; Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 221 ("once an
attorney is serving under a valid appointment by the court and an attorney-client
relationship has been established, the court may not arbitrarily remove the attorney over
objections of both the defendant and his counsel.").
Defense counsel does not "tamper with a witness" and create a conflict of interest
by the mere interview of witnesses. See Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223-24
(Tex.Rim. 1989). Indeed, "[i]f merely talking with a witness produces a disqualification
because there is a mere possibility that claims of misconduct could be made, then all
investigators, prosecutors, and defense lawyers will invariably be subject to being
removed. That simply and understandably is not the law." Id. at 224.
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In the majority of cases in which a conflict has been found, the attorneys have
either been involved in the criminal activity that formed the bases of their clients' charges
or potential charges or sought to serve as lawyer to more than one defendant in the
criminal activity. See e.g., State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,489 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)(lawyer's participation in the securities transaction which formed the basis of the
criminal charge resulted in disqualification of lawyer); Wheat, 486 U.S. at 156 (trial
court's disqualification of lawyer for co-defendant was proper where lawyer would be
limited in cross-examining prior client who was witness against present client). In
Johnson, the Utah Court of Appeals found that a conflict existed because the attorney
"was implicated as a coconspirator" and thus "had an interest in exonerating himself
which was not consistent with defending his client." Id. at 490. The state anticipated
calling Johnson's attorney as a witness and had evidence "that [the attorney] knew about
and participated in the planning of the [allegedly illegal] investment program in
question." Id. The Court of Appeals under these circumstances found an actual conflict
of interest that clearly affected defense counsel's performance. See also United States v.
Greig, 967 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1992)(conflict existed when defendant's attorney on two
separate occasions, approached a represented co-defendant without permission and
instructed him, contrary to co-defendant counsel's advice, to plead not guilty, assert
entrapment defense, and seek new counsel); United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506 (5th
Cir. 1983)(defense attorney's alleged participation in client's escape plan, the very crime
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for which client was charged, creates conflict of interest).14
Likewise, in Wheat, the United States Supreme Court upheld the disqualification
of a lawyer when that lawyer sought to represent a co-defendant in the transaction. It was
evident that the lawyer's earlier client had information relevant to the co-defendant's
case, was implicated in one or more of the drug transactions involving the co-defendant,
and a question about the parties' relative culpability was raised by the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court concluded that the attorney had a conflict because it would be
difficult if not impossible to cross-examine his earlier client about the joint transactions
involving his present client.
C. The Trial Court Findings on Conflict are Erroneous
In this case, the trial court found "there is a potential conflict that examination of
Mr. Wager at trial might raise issues which implicate either Mr. Mauro or Mr. Williams
to the Defendant's detriment." As part of its findings on the conflict issue, the court also
notes that the arrest of defense counsel "appears to be an unprecedented occurrence," and
that the arrest "has created a firestorm of controversy totally independent of the pending
capital homicide charge." The trial court does not explain how this conflict will manifest
itself at trial, nor why the court's explanation of the unprecedented nature of the arrest
and firestorm of controversy are in any way relevant to the conflict analysis.
It is unclear how the defense questioning of witness Wager will be compromised

14

These cases were cited by the state in its motion to disqualify.
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in any way by the defense team's arrest in Spokane. Unlike in Johnson or Wheat, Randy
Wager is neither a potential co-defendant in the underlying crime nor is there any
attorney-client privilege that would prevent or limit cross-examination. Instead, Mr.
Wager is like any other witness in a typical case, whose statements are subject to scrutiny
and questions of inconsistency by both sides.
A summary of Randy Wager's statements reveals no conflict or potential conflict.
On December 5, 2005, Mr. Wager called Burbridge and scheduled an interview. Mr.
Wager spoke to Detective Burbridge. These facts are undisputed. What Mr. Wager
might have said to police at the first or second interview is the subject of some dispute,
but Mr. Wager in two subsequent interviews, one with defense attorney Ken Brown and
the other with prosecutor Brad Smith, unequivocally states he was never told not to talk to
or cooperate with police. TR, 336-38, 620 (DVD Interview).
The varying scenarios of this information might be presented at trial as follows:
1. Mr. Wager is completely disabled, has admitted memory problems, was hit in
the back of his head in bar fight a few years ago and now suffers from grand mal
seizures which seem to exacerbate his memory problems. (TR, 620 DVD
Interview)
2. Mr. Wager spoke to police once or twice on December 6, 2005.15 In the
meeting or meetings, Mr. Wager answered questions about Wade Maughan which
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In the interview with prosecutor Smith, Mr. Wager describes how he spoke to
police about Wade Maughan, but when police returned he did not want to speak with
them in part because he was told not to talk to anyone, and in part because the police
accused him of lying. TR, Admittedly, Mr. Wager is either confused or mistaken about
the number of times he met with police.
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were similar to many of the questions asked by the defense team one day earlier.
3. Mr. Wager was reluctant to speak with police because they were against Wade.
TR,336.
4. Mr. Wager was uncomfortable in speaking with police because of prior bad
encounters with police, because police accused him of lying, tried to bully him,
and suggested he was obstructing justice.
5. Mr. Wager was told by the defense team "do not discuss this case with anybody
and do not discuss it with Wade." Mr. Wager interpreted the admonition not to talk
to anybody as including the police. Mr. Wager was never told not to talk to police.
This information does not create a conflict or potential conflict of interest.
Inconsistencies in testimony are a common thread in most criminal cases.16 To adopt the
state's logic, anytime an inconsistency arose between police and a witness, then grounds
for defense disqualification exist. That simply and understandably is not the law.
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Former Hofsta University of Law Dean Monroe Freedman, in his book
Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, eloquently described the process by which
inconsistencies in testimony occur:
[RJemembering is 'not the reexcitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and
fragmentary traces.' Rather it is 'an imaginative reconstruction or construction,
built out of the relation of our attitude towards the whole active mass of organized
past reactions or experience. Moreover, because remembering is 'rapidly affected
by unwitting transformations, accurate recall is the exception and not the rule.'
That is true even when material is arranged in a short series, is small in bulk and
simple in objective structure, and when it so given that an observer knows that he
or she will be asked to describe it later. Accordingly, in certain parts of 'ostensibly
factual reporting," we can be sure that 'a large proportion of the details will be
incorrect, even though presented with utmost certitude and in good faith.'
Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. (1975), at 66-67.
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Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 225.
In addition to what Mr. Wager would say, other witnesses present at the December
5, 2005 meeting likewise support a finding of neither conflict nor potential conflict. Alta
Raney remembers that the defense team "cautioned the witnesses not to contact [Mr.
Maughan] or share accounts with other witnesses in the interest of not compromising the
integrity of the accounts they were providing. This instruction was given to preserve
evidence." (TR, 643-44). She also remembers that Randy and Lorraine Rima were told
not to talk to Wade about the case over the telephone. TR, 361.
Ms. Rima, who was also present, is unsure about what was said to her or by whom.
Like Mr. Wager, Ms. Rima is disabled and has obvious memory problems as a result of
that disability. A review of her interview tapes shows she has no ability to accurately
relay conversations that occurred at the meeting with defense team lawyers, police, or
anyone else and cannot accurately recall any prior conversations.17
The only evidence of statements telling witnesses not to speak with police is by the
police themselves. Even though all the witnesses identified above spoke with police and
provided information, the police nonetheless contend that witnesses were told by
members of the defense team not to speak with police.
How this scenario presents any conflict is beyond logic. More importantly, how

17

The trial judge made no findings of conflict or potential conflict regrading Alta
Raney and Lorraine Rima, the two other witnesses who were present for the defense
interview.
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this creates a conflict in the cross-examination of Randy Wager is unknown, and not
explained by the trial court. Moreover, it is similarly unclear how these varying
descriptions of the pre-interview statements are even relevant to Mr. Maughan's case.
The fact is, regardless of how or why Mr. Wager was reluctant to talk to police, he
nonetheless spoke with them. There is no evidence that he was told to hide or fabricate
evidence or conceal anything.18 A Spokane City Police Officer's mistaken belief that
witness tampering occurred simply does not create a conflict. If an arrest of a lawyer
standing alone created a conflict, police could do that in every case in which they wanted
a different lawyer. That would have an obvious chilling effect on effective advocacy.
D. There is No Potential Conflict of Interest
The lynchpin of the trial court's finding seems to be that somehow Mr. Mauro
would be unable to cross-examine Randy Wager or Mr. Mauro might be reluctant to
conduct cross-examination because he was arrested for witness tampering. As discussed
above, neither the state nor the court has articulated how this potential conflict would
manifest itself in trial.19 The defense team interviewed the witnesses in accordance with
18

In its truncated findings, the trial court also found there to be a possible
violation of Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4. The court, however, fails to
articulate a factual basis for how the rule was violated nor identifies who on the defense
team violated the rule.
19

In light of what the witnesses have said, assuming that the arrest and attendant
proceedings are even relevant to Mr. Maughan's case, a more compelling argument is that
the police committed misconduct by arresting counsel as a means of prohibiting them
from access to the witnesses. Certainly, Detective Burbridge has shown little regard for
the process as he has "bullied" witnesses, accused them of lying, and threatened to arrest
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ABA Guidelines. The witnesses provided information and answered questions about
Wade Maughan and later spoke to police. This factual scenario simply does not create a
potential conflict of interest.
E. Investigator Ted Cilwick Does Not Have a Conflict of Interest
In its motion to disqualify, the state argues the Mr. Cilwick's investigation
provides an independent basis for defense counsel's disqualification. See Motion to
Disqualify, (TR, 65-66). For the reasons stated above, however, Mr. Cilwick does not
have a conflict of interest, actual or potential, and thus no independent basis exists for
disqualification. Mr. Cilwick is an eminently experienced capital investigator who
attended interviews as is required. In its motion the state erroneously compares Mr.
Cilwick's role here to role of the investigator in State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, when the
two are completely different.
In Arguelles, the investigator at the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association had
previously been a detective at the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. He was one of the
assigned investigators in the earlier cases against Mr. Arguelles. Finding a conflict of
interest, this Court found that the investigator "had specific knowledge of [defendant's]
prior offenses" which would be relevant and admissible. Id. at 755. "His testimony was

them for obstruction. One of the witness's lawyer has even contemplated filing a
protective order against Burbridge to prevent continued harassment of her client. If any
of that evidence is relevant at trial, it should be admitted to show the police participated in
misconduct.
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relevant to the nature and extent of [defendant's] criminal past, which would be
considered an aggravating factor at sentencing." They also specifically noted that "the
parties had no other adequate source for this information." Id.
Contrary to the investigator in Arguelles, Mr. Cilwick has no prior independent
knowledge of Mr. Maughan that could be used against him. Rather, in this case, Mr.
Cilwick was hired to serve in the necessary role of capital case investigator and
performed his duties in accordance with that role. See ABA Guidelines, §§ 1.1,4.1,10.4
&10.7; Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686 ("defense attorneys, to provide effective assistance of
counsel... must adequately investigate all potentially mitigating factors."); Stearnes, 780
S.W.2d at 224 (witness interviews should take place in presence of third persons).
F. There is No Basis to Disqualify Scott Williams
Similarly, Mr. Williams has no conflict or potential conflict as any contact with the
witnesses was entirely proper. The state's attenuated claim is that after being visited by
Scott Williams the witnesses' "versions changed but were remarkably similar." TR, 538.
They question whether Mr. Williams had a right and/or duty to talk these witnesses after
the arrest of Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick. They essentially claim that because Mr.
Williams spoke with the witnesses, those witnesses changed their stories. Of course, in
all of the recorded interviews of the witnesses, with both the defense and prosecution, the
witnesses consistently maintain that any misunderstandings in things told to them was
theirs (the witnesses), and not because of anything told to them by other members of the
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defense team. Again, how this creates a conflict is unclear.
Mr. Williams conducted interviews of the witnesses in accordance with the ABA
Guidelines, in the presence of an experienced investigator from Spokane, Washington.20
Once again, the witnesses say something different from what the police claim, a
circumstance that occurs in virtually every disputed court case. Inconsistent statements
by witnesses simply do not create a conflict or potential conflict.

II. IF THERE IS A CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT, MR.
MAUGHAN VALIDLY WAIVED IT.
A defendant in a criminal case can generally waive his right to conflict-free
counsel. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 490. "To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and
intelligent, and made 'only after adequate warning by the trial court of the potential
hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of the accused's right to other counsel.'" Id.
quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 750 (1st Cir. 1991)(per curiam). A trial
court may refuse to accept a waiver where there is an actual or potential conflict between
the defendant and his counsel. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 490; Wheat, 108 S.Ct. 1698-99.

20

Perhaps nothing illustrates the state's recklessness more clearly than their initial
assertion that David Finlayson, an attorney who has nothing to do with this case,
committed the criminal offense of witness tampering in Spokane, Washington. That
claim was based on nothing more than speculation. That and other claims made by the
state are particularly damaging in that this is a relatively high-profile murder case which
has received extensive press coverage. Many of the untrue allegations have appeared in
press reports which were initially reported as true.
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In this case, Mr. Maughan was fully appraised of the events creating the potential
conflict and the case status. (Transcript of Motion to Disqualify, 2/15/06, 42-45). The
defense team met with Mr. Maughan and discussed his options as directed by the trial
court. Mr. Maughan waived any conflict or potential conflict that might exist and
expressed his desire to retain both of his attorneys. Id. at 43 ("to the extent there is a
conflict or potential conflict [Mr. Maughan] would waive both of those as to both
lawyers."). As was represented to the trial court, Mr. Maughan had established equal
rapport and trust in both lawyers, had worked extensively with both lawyers over a threemonth period, and the entire defense team had established a trusting relationship with Mr.
Maughan's family in the development of the mitigation case. Id. He repeatedly
expressed his desire to retain both attorneys. (Transcript of Motion Hearing, 1/5/05, at 4;
Motion to Disqualify transcript, at 42).
The trial court agreed that any potential conflict was waivable. In fact, the court
accepted the waiver as to Mr. Mauro, but still ordered Mr. Maughan to discharge Mr.
Williams. The court did not explain why any potential conflict was waivable as to Mr.
Mauro, but not waivable as to Scott Williams. If there is a conflict or potential conflict,
Mr. Maughan should be allowed to waive it and retain both lawyers.
III. THE COURT'S INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN "POLICING THE
PROCESS" MANDATES THAT THE STATE NOT BE ALLOWED TO
ORCHESTRATE DISQUALIFICATION OF QUALIFIED COUNSEL
In its initial motion, the state maintained that the courts have an independent
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interest in policing the process and appearance of impropriety of counsel as it affects
public confidence in the proceedings. This is true in judging the conduct of both sides in
this case. Improper prosecution tactics must also be policed as there must be public
confidence that a fair trial was had and that improper prosecutorial means have not been
used. Cf. State v.Jameson, 134 P.2 173, 175-176 (Utah 1943). ("Both the court and
prosecutors should be zealous in protecting the rights of an accused and should carefully
refrain from doing or saying anything from which it might be inferred that an unfair
advantage was taken of a defendant"). Indeed, "[i]n his role as the State's representative
in criminal matters, the prosecutor... must not only attempt to win cases, but must see
that justice is done," and "while he should prosecute with earnestness and vigor it is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce wrongful
convictions as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Walker v.
State, 624 P.2 687, 691 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Gordon, 886 P.2 112 (Utah Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Hay, 859 P.2 1 (Utah 1993). Clearly, prosecutors have the absolute
duty to eschew all improper tactics. See State v. Saunders, 992 P.2 951, 961 (Utah 1999);
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2 781, 787 (Utah 1992). This duty is so fundamental, that
prosecutors must adhere to specialized rules of ethics. See Utah R. P. Cond. 3.8. In the
motion to disqualify and the unreliable allegations used to support it, the state prosecutors
here have completely ignored this duty to "eschew all improper tactics." Instead, the state
has mislead the court, admitted material information from the inquiry, mischaracterized
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the testimony of witnesses, and relied on assertions that have proven to be false.
The course of litigation in this case has descended into a series of false or reckless
claims made against anyone associated with the defense team.21 Perhaps the claim most
disturbing is the Elzinga allegation. There the state presented a very serious and
disturbing claim that one member of the defense team misrepresented himself as a
television reporter while another drove the getaway car. That claim is completely false.
Yet, the state published the allegations in a public pleading that was widely reported in
the press, sought and obtained a search warrant for an attorney's personal cell phone
records, and worked in connection with police to obtain information directly from the
defense team.

21

Professor Freedman, in quoting Former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
who was once United States Attorney General, spoke artfully about the dangers of
prosecutors "pick[ing] people he thinks he should get rather than pick[ing] cases that need
to be prosecuted:"
[Wjith the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a
fair chance of pinning at least a technical violation of some act on the part of
almost anyone. In such a case, [Justice Jackson] observed it is 'not a question of
discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has
committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law books
or putting investigators to work to pin some offense on him.9 At that point law
enforcement 'becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being
unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong
political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor
himself.'
Freedman, supra, at 81 quoting Address by Justice Robert Jackson, Second Annual
Conference of U.S. Attorneys, April 1940.
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The defense hired an investigator, investigated the claim, sought independent
phone records, and ultimately showed the claim to be absolutely false. Moreover, at the
time the initial claim was made, the police should have known of problems with Ms.
Elzinga based on her relationship with the victim's family and love interest in the codefendant. Nonetheless, the state still proceeded with the allegation in the hope that they
could "pin some offense" on defense team members and force the trial court to remove
them.
They made similar unfounded claims of misconduct against the defense team and
their lawyers when the witnesses in Spokane obtained attorneys after being threatened
with criminal prosecution. This case is extraordinary and perhaps unlike any other capital
case. There were initially two lawyers appointed to represent Mr. Maughan. Those
lawyers had to retain one lawyer in Spokane and a law firm in Utah to represent them.
The mitigation specialist has retained an attorney, while the three witnesses in Spokane
retained attorneys to represent them. All toll, there are nine lawyers involved in this case
which has not yet had a preliminary hearing.
In light of the totality of circumstances, this Court should view the state's claims
with caution. See Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692 , 819 P.2d 110 (Idaho App. 1991)
(motions to disqualify opposing counsel "should be viewed with caution" as such motions
"can be misused as a technique for harassment."); Gomez v. Superior Court in andfor
Pinal County, 111 P.2d 902, 905 (Ariz. 1986)(court "views with suspicion motions by

44

opposing counsel to disqualify a party's attorney based on conflict of interest or
appearance of impropriety"); Lorin v. 501 Second St., LLC, 2 Misc.3d 646, 769 N.Y.S.2d
361, 364 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003)("Disqualification motions are carefully scrutinized because
they seek to deny a party's right to representation by an attorney of his or her choice and
thereby limit a valued right to the party."); Alexander v. Superior Court, 685 P.2d 1309,
1313 (Ariz. 1984)("only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed
to interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent."); State v. Madrid, 468
P.2d 561, 562 (Ariz. 1970)("For the prosecution to participate in the selection or rejection
of opposing counsel is unseemly if for no other reason than the distasteful impression
which could be conveyed."). The government here has sought to manufacture a conflict
where none exists.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Maughan contends that there is neither a conflict nor potential conflict of
interest which justifies the removal of appointed counsel. The trial judge's ruling is
erroneous and should be overturned by this Court. Mr. Maughan asks this court to
overrule the trial court and to reinstate both of Mr. Maughan's attorneys.
DATED this 7

day of January, 2007

RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Appellant, Wade Maughan
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ADDENDUM A

Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
T ul
l b y ^ l m p a r t i a l j m y ° f t h e S t a t e a n d d i s t r i c t wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation- to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Laws 1994, S.J R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov 8, 1994, eff. Jan 1, 1995

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs
Case No. 051100355
WADE GARRETT MAUGHAN,
Defendant.

HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

This case is before the Court pursuant to the State's Motion to Disqualify Counsel.
After extensive briefing and argument, the Court issues the following decision:
1. The arrest of defense counsel in another jurisdiction on charges of witness
tampering related to a witness in this case appears to be an unprecedented
occurrence.
2. The arrest and potential prosecution of defense counsel has created a firestorm
of controversy totally independent of the pending capital homicide charges.
3. There is the continuing possibility of prosecution of defense counsel in the state
of Washington or of other proceedings under Rule 3.4 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
4. This case is in the earliest stages; a preliminary hearing has not even been
scheduled.
5. There is a potential conflict that examination of Mr Wagar at trial might raise
issues which implicate either Mr Mauro or Mr Williams to the Defendant's
detriment.
This Court must balance "Defendant's right to be represented by an attorney of his
choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility,

the public concern in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of
justice."
State v Johnson. 823 P2nd, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
This Court is persuaded that there is "at least a reasonable possibility that either a
serious violation of law or ethical standards occurred. The Court therefore directs that a
new lead counsel be appointed from among those qualified for this type of case. The
normal procedure utilized by the Administrative Office of the Courts shall be followed.
In an attempt to balance the Defendant's 6th Amendment rights, the Court will allow
the Defendant to confer with counsel during the noon hour and then select one of the
current counsel to remain as co-counsel on this case. That election will be made in open
court after Mr Maughan is advised of the potential conflicts of interest.
This Court is not making a finding that defense counsel have committed wrongdoing.
On the contrary, this Court's prior dealings with both defense counsel have all been
positive. The Court finds today only that there is a reasonable possibility that witness
tampering occurred.
Dated this 15th day of February, 2006.

BY THE COURT

rf.

Judge Ben H Hadfiel
District Judge

ADDENDUM C
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1

occurred.

2

and it was different from the others.

3

When it didn't play, I got to studying the disk

MR. BROWN:
but Ifm not.

4
5I

You know, I wish I was more technical,

If you've got a laptop --

THE COURT:

I'll get somebody downstairs to help me,

6

They always do when I get in trouble with the computer.

7

We'll see if we can make it play on one of the computers.

8

All right.

91
10 I
11
12

Court is in recess.

THE BAILIFF:

Court is in recess.

(Recess pending judge's review.)
THE BAILIFF:

The judge will not be coming back in,

so court is in recess.

13

(Lunch recess.)

14

THE COURT:

We're back on the record in the matter

15

of State of Utah versus Wade Garrett Maughan.

16

is present along with counsel.

17

have been provided a copy of the court's memorandum decision

18

issued this morning.

19

The defendant

Counsel and the defendant

Mr. Maughan, have you had an opportunity over the noon

20 I hour to visit with your attorneys?
21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23
24

Yes, I have.

All right.

Is it your desire to retain

one of them as co-counsel on this case?
THE DEFENDANT:

25 1 them as counsel.

It's my desire to retain both of
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1

THE COURT:

2

record.

I understand that.

You told me that I believe in our last hearing.

3

THE DEFENDANT:

41

THE COURT:

5

That's clear on the

Yeah.

You've seen the written decision that I

issued, correct?

61

MR. MAURO:

Judge, we went over that with him and

7

discussed it with him.

8

conflict, or potential conflict, we have advised Mr. Maughan

9

of the court's ruling.

10

THE COURT:

Although we disagree that there's a

Okay.

So he understands that I will

11

allow him to make an election in as much as -- I understand

12

his position is he wants both of you?

13

MR. MAURO:

Yes.

And Mr. Williams and I met with

14

him, along with Mr. Cilwick, over the lunch hour.

Mr.

15

Maughan indicated to us that to the extent there is a

16

conflict or potential conflict he would waive both of those

17

as to both lawyers.

18

Mr. Maughan during the lunch hour.

19

he has an equal relationship with both of us, has an equal

20

degree of trust in both of us.

21

his case.

22

We have employed ancillary people to assist us in the

23

representation of Mr. Maughan.

24

them.

25

have begun significant efforts at completing mitigation in

That was the discussion that we had with
He indicated to us that

We have worked extensively on

We have discussed the facts of the case with him.

Mr. Maughan has met with

We have established a rapport with his family.

We
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1

this case.

2

is why, if there is a conflict or a potential conflict as to

3

both lawyers, Mr. Maughan would be willing to waive that.

4

Mr. Maughan is aware of all that.

THE COURT:

Understood.

I believe that

I think counsel clearly

5

understand, though, that the court has issued its decision.

6

So, Mr. Maughan, at this point, if you don't elect one of

7 I them, then I'll appointment new co-counsel as well.

But if

8

you want one of these gentlemen to remain on your case, I'll

9

allow to you tell me that.

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

So I have to make a choice?

Yes.

And if you need another five

12 minutes to go back and talk with somebody about it, I'll give
13
14
15

you that time.
THE DEFENDANT:

If I have to make a choice, I

think Mr. Mauro.

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

No.

You're asking to keep Mr. Mauro as

—

Yes.

You understand that he'll be co-counsel?

The new attorney will be the lead attorney on your case?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

That will be the order of

22

the court, then.

23

defense fund, do one of you want to prepare an order of some

24

kind so that will fit with their requirements?

25

Counsel, for purposes of the capital

MR. STEVENSON:

Sure.
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MR. MAURO:

Judge, would you stay an order for about

2

five days?

Would you stay an order to about next Wednesday?

3

Then have an order that would be due on that date.

4

THE COURT:

Any objection from the state?

5

MR. STEVENSON:

6

THE COURT:

The state has no objection.

All right.

That's fine.

We'll stay

7

that until -- that would make it Wednesday, the 22nd of

8

February.

9

court will enter it.

10

And then at that time if an order is submitted the

MR. MAURO:

May I ask a question on a different

11 matter but still relating to Mr. Maughan's case?
12

THE COURT:

Yes.

13

MR.

NO,

14
15

MAUROL

Do you want this on the record?
that's fine.

(Sidebar, not reported.)
THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Maughan, you've had the

16

opportunity to visit with counsel about the potential

17

conflicts of interest that could occur; is that correct?

18

They've talked with you about that?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

Yeah.

The court is going to allow you to waive

21

any potential conflicts and have Mr. Mauro represent you, as

22

I indicated I would.

23

that that is a potential issue.

24

something arose where Mr. Mauro would possibly become a

25

witness, he wouldn't be allowed to testify because he's your

I want to make sure that you're aware
If, for instance, at trial
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attorney.

Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you need any more time to talk with

counsel?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I don't think so.

All right.

Not at this time,

Any other issues we need to

address this afternoon, counsel?
MR. STEVENSON:

No, Your Honor.

MR. MAURO:

Nothing.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

THE BAILIFF:

Court is in recess.

Court is in recess.

(Hearing concluded.)

